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Civil Liability o f Court-Appointed Experts in German Law
THOMAS THIEDE*
Abstract: This article highlights some distinct features of the German rules on the 
liability of court-appointed experts. It lays out the origins, developments and 
discussions of German practice and literature in this area resulting in the enactment 
of the statutory rule on the liability of court appointed experts in section 839a BGB as 
an action in tort. Further requirements of such liability, including the standard of care 
expected from the expert and the limits of possible compensation for losses caused by 
an erroneous opinion are discussed.
1. Introduction
In today’s modern society, we have accepted that striving for increasing 
professional specialization of each individual is necessary in order to ensure the 
current and future well being of society.1 Clearly, judges are unable to keep up 
with the pace of such specialization and hence are bound to rely on ‘externalized’ 
knowledge, which in most cases is provided by court-appointed experts. With the 
vast technological development over the last century, the work of such experts has 
gained importance as judges have increasingly relied on their findings. 
Accordingly, if such a court-appointed expert delivers an erroneous opinion on 
which the judgment of the court is based, the judgment will equally be flawed as 
it would not represent the true factual and, accordingly, legal position.2 As this 
may very well result in harm to (usually) one party to the case, the German 
legislator decided to take action in 2002 and make court-appointed experts liable 
for harm resulting from false expert opinions by introducing a new action for such 
liability in section 839a Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) (Civil Code).
Any individual with above-average scientific, technical, or professional 
expertise can be nominated as an expert by the court.3 There is no specialized
* Dr.iur., Dipl.-Jur., LL.B., LL.M., Institute for European Tort Law, Austrian Academy of Sciences, 
Vienna; Fellow of the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL), Vienna; University 
Assistant at the Centre for European Private Law (CEP), University of Graz, Austria. The author 
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1 See A. SMITH, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations, 5th edn, 
Methuen & Co, London 1904, pp. 19 et seq. (pin maker), available online <http://www.econ 
lib.org/library/Smith/smWNCover.html> (9 Jul. 2013).
2 German procedural law represents (to a limited extent in civil procedure) an inquisitorial system 
(as opposed to an adversarial system used in common law countries); that is, the court is asked to 
actively investigate the true facts of the case.
3 BGH (Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice)) 23 May 1984, N JW  (Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift) 1984, p. 2365 at 2366; P. BLEUTGE, ‘Die Hilfskräfte des Sachverständigen -
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training for experts and no specific personal education that results in a 
professional life as an expert in court. The only condition is - as section 839a 
BGB clearly sets out - appointment by the court.4 It is for the judge to decide5 
who constitutes a specialist to support the exercise of the court’s functions 
(Gehilfe des Gerichts).6 In civil proceedings, such a specialist is typically 
appointed in the form of an evidence order7 or any other order;8 in criminal 
proceedings, a simplified evidence order of the chief judge suffices.9
It is well established that four different means of such assistance to the 
judge exist. Firstly, the appointed expert may present abstract-theoretical 
observations in his area of expertise with no reference to the facts of the case; it is 
the judge who then has to apply these to the facts of the case (Vermittling von 
Erfahrungssätzen und Regeln). In the majority of cases, however, the appointed 
expert will apply his knowledge to the case at hand and will submit his 
conclusions and how he arrived at these conclusions to the judge (Beurteilung von 
Tatsachen).10 The court’s mandate could also include the investigation and,
Mitarbeiter ohne Verantwortung?’ , N JW  1985, p. 1185 at 1187; H. BREMER, Der 
Sachverständige, 2nd edn, Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 1973, p. 21; A. HEGLER, ‘Die 
Unterscheidung des Sachverständigen vom Zeugen im Prozeß’ , 104 AcP (Archiv fü r  die 
civilistische Praxis) 1909, p. 151 at 153; M. STAHL, Zur Dritthaftung von Rechtsanwälten, 
Steuerberatern, Wirtschaftsprüfern und öffentlich bestellten und vereidigten Sachverständigen, 
Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 31; C. THOLE, Die Haftung des gerichtlichen 
Sachverständigen nach §  839a BGB, Carl Heymanns, Köln/Berlin/München 2004, p. 3; 
MünchKommBGB/G. WAGNER, sec. 839a BGB, 5th edn, Beck, München 2009, No. 6 et seq.; 
Staudinger/M. WURM, sec. 839a BGB, Sellier/de Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2007, No. 1.
4 Opinions by all other private or public experts (especially those nominated by a party 
(Parteigutachten)) represent substantiated submissions and are thus excluded from liability even 
in cases where both parties subsequently agree on the correctness of the opinion submitted. BGH
27 May 1982, N JW  1982, p. 2874 at 2875; BGH 10 Oct. 2000, N JW  2001, p. 77 at 78; C. 
THOLE (n. 3), p. 3; MünchKommZPO/W. ZIMMERMANN, sec. 402 ZPO, 3rd edn, Beck, 
München 2008, No. 9.
5 See sec. 404, para. 1 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (Code of Civil Procedure), available online 
<http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html> (9 Jul. 2013).
6 BVerfG (Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)) 5 May 1987, N JW  1987, 
p. 2500 at 2501; BGH 19 Nov. 1964, N JW  1965, p. 298 at 299 =  BGHZ 
(Bundesgerichtshofentscheidungen in Zivilsachen) 62, p. 54 at 59; BGH 31 Jan. 1968, N JW  1968, 
p. 787 at 788; MünchKommZPO/W. ZIMMERMANN, sec. 402 ZPO, No. 2.
7 See secs 358 et seq. ZPO.
8 M. HUBER, ‘ § 404 ZPO’ , in H.-J. Musielak (ed.), Zivilprozessordnung, 9th edn, Franz Vahlen, 
München 2012, No. 1; MünchKommZPO/W. ZIMMERMANN, sec. 402 ZPO, No. 5.
9 Compare sec. 238, para. 1 StPO (Strafprozessordnung, Code of Criminal Procedure); BGH 3 Jun. 
1982, N StZ (Neue Zeitschrift fü r  Strafrecht) 1982, p. 432; J. EICKMEIER, Die Haftung des 
gerichtlichen Sachverständigen fü r  Vermögensschäden, Carl Heymanns, Köln/Berlin/München 
1993, pp. 29 et seq.
10 BVerfG 11 Oct. 1994, N JW  1995, p. 40 at 41 =  BVerfGE (Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts) 91, p. 176; BGH 18 Oct. 1977, N JW  1978, p. 751.
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subsequently, the reporting of the relevant facts to the case (Feststellung von 
Tatsachen kraft besonderer Sachkunde)1  Finally, and very rarely, experts are 
appointed to render an opinion on foreign or customary law and statutes.12
2. Com pensatory Regim e
Historically, the role of court-appointed experts was not regarded as exceptional 
in comparison to that of other tortfeasors and, accordingly, no specialized rule 
was provided in the BGB of 1900.13 As a result, German practice and literature 
developed the following distinct system to deal with the problem. To begin with, 
it seems clear that any direct contractual action taken by the parties against the 
expert will fail as no contract was concluded between them.14 This extends to 
actions based on the civilian doctrine of culpa in contrahendo as the expert does 
not provide for the extended confidence of the parties.15 One could argue, 
however, that the obligations between the court and the expert also extend to a 
considerable degree to the parties and thus an action could be based on such a 
contract to the benefit of a third party (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten 
Dritter). German courts have always rejected16 such an extension of the duties of 
the expert as the relation between court and expert (öffentlich-rechtliche 
Sonderbeziehung sui generis) was, in their view, intended only as being subject to 
the court order but not other remedies provided in civil law.
As the role of the expert was highlighted by the court, one could infer that 
the expert was so close to the state that his misfeasance ought to come under the 
heading of state liability (sec. 839 BGB, Art. 34 Grundgesetz (GG) (German 
Constitution)): it is good law that this action is not limited to public officers but 
includes all persons performing a public duty (haftungsrechtlicher 
Beamtenbegriff ).17 Nevertheless, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (Federal Court of
11 M. HUBER, ‘sec. 404 ZPO’ , in H.-J. Musielak (ed.), Zivilprozessordnung (n. 8), No. 1.
12 See sec. 293 ZPO; BGH 30 Mar. 1976, N JW  1976, p. 1581 at 1583; E. SCHILKEN, ‘Zur 
Rechtsnatur der Ermittlung ausländischen Rechts nach § 293 ZPO’ , in Festschrift Schumann, 
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2001, pp. 373 et seq.
13 For an in-depth assessment of the historical starting point and the development in the twentieth 
century, see H. HONSELL, ‘Die Haftung für Gutachten und Auskunft unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung von Drittinteressen’ , in Festschrift Medicus, Carl Heymanns, Köln/ 
Berlin/München 1999, pp. 211 et seq.
14 BGH 19 Nov. 1964 (n. 6), p. 315; BGH 5 Oct. 1972, N JW  1973, p. 554 =  BGHZ 59, p. 310, at 
311.
15 Actions for Parteigutachten (see n. 4) would be compensated under this heading.
16 See, e.g., BGH 20 May 2003, N JW 2003, p. 2825 at 2826, with further reference.
17 BGH 21 Jan. 1993, BGHZ  121, p. 161 at 164; BGH 16 Apr. 1964, BGHZ  42, p. 176 at 178 = 
N JW  1964, p. 1895 at 1897; OLG (Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court)) Hamm, N JW  
1972, p. 2088; Staudinger/M. WURM, sec. 839a BGB  (n. 3), No. 37; MünchKommBGB/H.-J. 
PAPIER, sec. 839 BGB, 5th edn, Beck, München 2009, No. 129 et seq., with extensive further 
reference.
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Justice) had previously dismissed such liability and demanded instead a close 
connection between the harmful action and the public duty18 to establish liability, 
that is, the false expert opinion and the expert’s role in the court.19 Regarding the 
expert’s liability, the court held in this regard that the expert is no closer to the 
court than a witness, for whom no state liability is assumed.20 Similar to a 
witness, the expert fulfils his own civic responsibilities with his activities and not 
official duties of the state and, accordingly, does not act as an official.21 
Accordingly, the state should not be rendered liable when an expert submits a 
false opinion. As a result, the expert himself will have to bear liability.
In German law, such liability may arise from section 823, paragraph 1 
BGB, requiring the violation of one of the enumerated legally protected interests, 
and notably does not result in any compensation for pure economic loss. As the 
property or the general right to one’s personality may very well be affected, the 
controversies on the topic focussed on the question of fault on the side of the 
expert. Opinions have ranged from a complete refusal of any privilege (i.e., the 
expert is liable for the slightest negligence, culpa levissima)22 to a limitation of 
the liability to cases of intentional behaviour (Vorsatz) promoted by the BGH.23 
The court argued that recourse actions against appointed experts in cases of the 
slightest of negligence would open the floodgates to an excessive number of 
subsequent proceedings with the aim of the factual ‘withdrawal’24 of the original 
decision. In the court’s view, the role of the expert as assistant to the court could 
not result in the imputation of liability for even slight mistakes as he is 
performing his civic responsibility dutifully.25 Finally, the BGH feared the future 
hesitation of potential experts to engage in work for the courts when faced with a 
potentially far-reaching liability.26 In the BGH’s view, a distinction between gross 
and slight negligence was too precarious to apply - therefore the liability of 
experts should be limited to intentional misfeasance only.27 The latter judgment 
of the BGH is one of the rather rare cases where the Bundesverfassungsgericht
18 BGH 26 Nov. 1953, BGHZ  11, p. 181 at 185; BGH 16 Apr. 1964, BGHZ  42, p. 176 at 179 = 
N JW 1964, p. 1895 at 1897; MünchKommBGB/H.-J. PAPIER, sec. 839 BGB (n. 17), No. 188.
19 BGH 5 Oct. 1972, N JW  1973, p. 554 =  BGHZ  59, p. 310 at 312.
20 BGH (n. 19), p. 315.
21 Ibid.
22 H. ARNDT, ‘Die Haftung des gerichtlichen Sachverständigen’ , DRiZ (Deutsche Richterzeitung) 
1973, pp. 272 et seq.; J. HELLMER, ‘Zur Frage der Haftung des gerichtlichen Sachverständigen 
für unrichtiges Gutachten’ , N JW  1974, pp. 556 et seq.; G. WASNER, ‘Die Haftung des 
gerichtlichen Sachverständigen’ , N JW  1986, pp. 119 et seq.
23 BGH 18 Dec. 1974, N JW  1974, p. 312 =  BGHZ  62, p. 54 at 56.
24 BGH 19 Nov. 1964, BGHZ  42, p. 313 at 318.
25 BGH 31 Jan. 1968, N JW  1968, p. 787 at 788; BGH (n. 23), p. 60.
26 BGH (n. 23), p. 60.
27 BGH (n. 23), p. 61.
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(BVerfG) (German Supreme Court) used its right to overturn rulings by other 
courts and annulled the BGH’s judgment:28 in the view of the BVerfG, the harmed 
party would be deprived of their constitutional rights (Art. 2, para. 2 GG) if no 
compensation was rendered even in cases of gross negligence (Grobe 
Fahrlässigkeit) of the expert.29 Thus, liability for gross negligence of the expert 
became recognized as judge-made part of the law.30
A second option for liability exists in section 823, paragraph 2 BGB, 
imposing an obligation to make amends on anyone who violates a statutory 
provision intended for the protection of others. The protective provisions 
potentially violated are those of the German Criminal Code for False Testimony 
and Perjury, sections 154 and following Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) (Penal Code).31 
The Reichsgericht (RG) (Supreme Court of the German Reich) held that the 
purpose of the rules on false testimony and perjury was, inter alia , to protect the 
parties to the proceedings,32 and thus the expert will be liable under section 823, 
paragraph 2 BGB if he submitted a false expert opinion intentionally or 
negligently, under oath. However, such liability appears to have little, if any, 
relevance today. Firstly, the claimant must prove fault on the side of the expert, a 
task that is rarely successful.33 Secondly, the expert must be sworn in, which is 
almost never the case in civil proceedings and occurs only rarely in criminal 
proceedings.34
As a result, in lieu of an express rule, under the system developed by 
German practice and literature, appointed experts became liable under section 
823, paragraph 1 BGB in all cases of grossly negligent or intentional false 
opinions resulting in harm for any of the specified interests enumerated in said 
provision. In cases where these experts were sworn in, they were fully liable in all 
cases, including those where the expert acted with slight negligence.
28 BVerfG 11 Oct. 1978, N JW 1979, p. 305 =  BVerfGE 49, p. 304.
29 BVerfG (n. 28), p. 316.
30 The BVerfG split on the question whether the expert should be held liable in cases of slight 
negligence as well; four of the eight judges argued for a limitation to gross negligence; the other 
four were arguably striving for consistence and held that any limitation would undermine the 
victim’s position and the current law would provide for a decision of the legislator, which shall 
not be altered by the judiciary. BVerfG (n. 28), p. 323.
31 See MünchKommBGB/G. WAGNER, sec. 823 BGB, 5th edn, Beck, München 2009, No. 269, 
with extensive further reference.
32 Reichsgericht (RG) (Supreme Court of the German Reich) 1 Dec. 1904, RGZ (Entscheidungen des 
Reichsgerichts) 59, p. 236, 237.
33 C. THOLE (n. 3), p. 31. This applies also to the third and final tier of liability under German law, 
i.e., sec. 826 BGB providing for compensation for all intentionally inflicted damage on another 
person.
34 Ibid.
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3. L iab ility  A ccording to Section 8 3 9 a  BGB
Confronted with this situation, the German legislator decided to take action and 
introduce a new action for damages in section 839a BGB. The provision reads as 
follows:
Liability of court-appointed experts
(1) If an expert appointed by the court intentionally or by gross negli­
gence submits a false expert opinion, then he is liable to make compensation 
for the damage incurred by a party to the proceedings as a result of a court 
decision based on this expert opinion.
(2) Section 839 (3) applies with the necessary modifications.35
With this provision, that was introduced to the BGB with the Act on the 
Amendment of the Rules on Compensation of Damage36 and has been in force 
since 1 August 2002, the German legislator arguably achieved two legislative 
goals. Firstly, a legal basis was proposed for all those cases where the grossly 
negligent false expert opinion did not result in compensation because the harm 
sustained was pure economic loss. Such expansion of liability is, however, curbed 
by the required standard of conduct, thus putting experts under oath at a certain 
advantage. Secondly, for all other experts the prior state of law is now codified.
According to the provision, an opinion must be rendered by an expert 
appointed by the court. Such experts are all persons designated by the court to 
provide abstract-theoretical observations, conclusions, or opinions on foreign or 
customary law and statutes.37 Clearly, the provision applies to all experts 
appointed and does not differentiate between criminal and civil procedures or the 
reason for the appointment. An expert opinion is deemed false when it represents 
the factual reality incorrectly - or to put it simply: when it is wrong.38 In a next 
step, this incorrect opinion must have been rendered by the expert intentionally 
or with gross negligence. Such fault must not be connected to the occurrence of 
harm but only to the (possibly poor) opinion.39 Intentional fault is present when 
the expert renders the opinion incorrectly, knowing and wanting to render such
35 Langenscheidt Translation, available online <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ 
index.html> (9 Jul. 2013).
36 Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung schadensersatzrechtlicher Vorschriften, BGBl. (Bundesgesetzblatt 
(Federal Law Gazette)) I 2002, pp. 2674 et seq., available online <http://www.bundesanzeiger- 
verlag.de/evidenzzentrale/> (9 Jul. 2013).
37 See supra  n. 10 et seq.
38 Compare Explanatory Memorandum of the Federal Government, BT-Drucks. 
(Bundestagsdrucksache, Official Records of the Parliament) 14/7752, pp. 27 et seq.
39 For the parallel question in sec. 823, para. 2, 839 BGB, see BGH 20 Mar. 1961, N JW  1961, 
p. 1157 =  BGHZ 34, p. 375 at 381; BGH, 8 Feb. 1965, N JW  1965, p. 962 at 963; for sec. 839a 
BGB, see MünchKommBGB/G. WAGNER sec. 839a BGB (n. 3), no. 18; Staudinger/M. WURM,
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an opinion (dolus directus). It suffices, however, if the expert foresees the 
incorrectness of his opinion and proceeds accepting his liability tacitly (dolus 
eventualis).40 As in practice, however, such intentional behaviour of the expert is 
rarely present and almost impossible to prove;41 the second alternative of the 
provision, that is, liability for gross negligence, is of utmost importance. For this 
alternative, a line must be drawn between gross and slight negligence. In general, 
a person who fails to observe the ordinary care that is required in everyday life 
acts negligently.42 Regarding experts, this standard translates to the relevant field 
of expertise;43 that is, an expert who blatantly fails to observe the ordinary care 
that is required by a reputable expert in his discipline acts negligently. Moreover, 
this action must be grossly negligent, which is to say obviously substantially below 
the standard expected of an expert. He must have crossed the line between ‘this 
could happen’ to ‘this should by no means happen’.44 This is, for example, the 
case when the expert clearly understood that he would not be capable of rendering 
a correct opinion on the topic due to his lack of competence or personal and 
technical means.45 Additionally, any expert who renders an opinion without any 
visual inspection where such inspection is needed will act in a grossly negligent
46manner.
If these conditions are fulfilled, the expert is liable to the party in the case 
for the damage resulting from the court order to the extent that this is based on 
the incorrect opinion. Two different types of damage may arise in this context:47 
damage directly connected to the court order (Urteilsschäden) corresponds in civil 
proceedings to damage resulting from the influence of the opinion on the 
disputed claim. Such Urteilsschäden are contrasted by damage that any party 
suffers due to a procedural error that had ultimately no impact on the final court
sec. 839a BGB (n. 3), no. 11; C. THOLE (n. 3), 103; of different opinion E. DEUTSCH, 
‘Privilegierte Haftung und Schadensfolge’ , N JW 1966, p. 705 (connection to the harm as a signal 
to the potential tortfeasor).
40 See BGH (n. 23), p. 56; OLG Köln, BB (Betriebsberater) 1993, p. 891; OLG München, VersR 
(Versicherungsrecht) 1977, p. 482.
41 Apparently, this applies to only one case decided, OLG Köln, VersR 1994, p. 611 at 612 =  BB 
1993, p. 891.
42 BGH 11 May 1953, BGHZ  10, p, 14 at 16; BGH 17 Oct. 1966, VersR 1966, p. 1150; BGH 25 
Jan. 1982, N JW  1982, p. 874.
43 MünchKommBGB/S. GRUNDMANN, sec. 2 7 6 BGB, 5th edn, Beck, München 2007, No. 105.
44 E. FREY, ‘Die Beschränkung der Schadensersatzpflicht des Arbeitnehmers’ , AuR (Arbeit und 
Recht) 1953, p. 7 at 8.
45 For an example, see BGH 23 Feb. 1999, N JW  1999, p. 2736.
46 BT-Drucks. 11/4528, p. 175.
47 MünchKommBGB/G. WAGNER, sec. 839a BGB  (n. 3), No. 24; C. THOLE (n. 3), p. 116; 
U. HOFFMANN, Die Haftung des vom Gericht bestellten Sachverständigen, Hoffmann, Marburg 
1978, p. 32; K. PRANGE, Materiell-rechtliche Sanktionen bei Verletzung der prozessualen 
Wahrheitspflicht durch Zeugen und Parteien, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995, pp. 16 et seq.
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order (Begleitschäden). As section 839a BGB provides that only the former 
Urteilsschäden are compensable because only damage qualifying as ‘the result of a 
court decision based on [the] expert opinion’ is eligible for indemnification.48 
Potential damage entails any direct loss resulting from the court order, and all 
costs of the original and subsequent levels of legal action as those are directly 
related to its result and thus a ‘result of [the] court decision’.49 The court order - 
necessary to determine such damage - is understood as the dictum of the legal 
consequence by the judge as the result of his assessment of the facts and the 
application of the objective law to these facts. Such court orders may appear as 
judgments, decisions, or executive orders (sec. 160, para. 3 Zivilprozessordnung 
(Code of Civil Procedure)).
Two limitations to such liability of the expert must, however, be duly 
observed. The first limiting restriction is already indirectly addressed in the above 
paragraph when stating that the damage must be consequential on the court’s 
order.50 In other words, any liability of the expert is limited to the damage caused 
by the court order only. The expert opinion must be a condition of the harm 
sustained due to the judgment (the standard requirement that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate natural causation), and the expert opinion must qualify as an 
adequate cause of the harm sustained, which is the case when the opinion 
significantly increases the risk of an incorrect judgment and thus the harm that 
actually occurred. The second limitation results from reference to section 839, 
paragraph 3 BGB in section 839a, paragraph 2 BGB. The former provision 
stipulates that liability for damage does not arise if the injured person has 
intentionally or negligently failed to avert the damage by having recourse to 
appeal. Accordingly, any action against the expert will fail on these grounds; in 
this situation, a claim against the expert is not simply barred; it does not even 
come into existence.51 This limitation is assisted by a wide understanding of 
potential judicial remedies by the injured as it is good law that those entail all 
potential actions against the breach of the official duties of the judge, including 
even formal and disciplinary complaints, indicative information, and inquiries.52
48 MünchKommBGB/G. WAGNER, sec. 839a BGB  (n. 3), No. 24; C. THOLE (n. 3), p. 116; 
K. PRANGE (n. 48), p. 16.
49 MünchKommBGB/G. WAGNER, sec. 839a BGB  (n. 3), No. 24; Staudinger/M . WURM, sec. 839a 
BGB  (n. 3), No. 7; C. THOLE (n. 3), p. 121.
50 BGH 9 Mar. 2006, N JW  2006, p. 1733; G. WAGNER & C. THOLE, ‘Die Haftung des 
Wertgutachters gegenüber dem Ersteigerer’ , VersR 2004, p. 275 at 276; Staudinger/M. WURM, 
sec. 839a BGB  (n. 3), No. 7, p. 17.
51 Thus, other forms of contributory negligence (see sec. 254 BGB) and any reduction of damages 
are dismissed in this regard.
52 BGH 29 Nov. 1954, BGHZ  15, p. 305 at 313 =  N JW  1955, p. 297 at 298; BGH 9 Jul. 1958, 
BGHZ 28, p. 104 at 106 =  N JW  1958, p. 1532; BGH 31 Mar. 1960, N JW  1960, p. 1718; BGH,
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4 . Conclusions
From a comparative perspective, some distinct features of the German provisions 
on the liability of court-appointed experts should be (re-)emphasized. To begin 
with, German law provides for a clear rule on the liability of court-appointed 
experts in section 839a BGB as an action in tort. This rule draws from the 
previous works of German practice and literature and stipulates the liability of any 
appointed expert for damage resulting from the judgment to the extent that the 
latter relies on the erroneous opinion without any further distinction between 
civil or criminal proceedings. As the German procedural system is (generally) of 
an inquisitorial nature, that is, the judge is asked to establish the factual truth, 
the duty of care is owed to the court only, not to the parties in the case. The 
standard of care expected from the expert is that of ordinary care required by a 
reputable expert in his discipline. Only if he is intentionally or grossly negligent 
can any liability of the expert be established. If this is successful, damages entail 
compensation of the loss that results directly from the incorrect judgment; any 
secondary damage is disregarded. Finally, any liability is excluded if the injured 
party fails to avert the damage by having recourse to appeal.
16 Jan. 1986, VersR 1986, p. 575; BGH 3 Jun. 1993, BGHZ  123, p. 1 at 7 =  N JW  1993, p. 3061 
at 3063; BGH 16 Nov. 2000, N JW  2001, p. 1067 at 1068; MunchKommBGB/H.-J. PAPIER, sec. 
839 BGB  (n. 17), No. 331 et seq.
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